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Lemma  W. Senbet
Country  funds  traded  in the developed  capital markets  can help
promote  the  efficiency  of  pricing  in the  emerging  capital  markets
and can enhance  capital  mobilization  by local firms.
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Diwan,  Errunza,  and Senbet  theoretically  ana-  value. They also show that the efficiency  gains
lyze country  funds,  focusing  on emerging  that arise with the development  of new funds
economies  in which capital markets  are not  can be positive  even when these funds  start
readily  accessible  to outside  investors. They  trading  at a discount.
study  country-fund  pricing  and the associated
policy implications  under altemative  variations  They conclude  with a catalog  of policy
on segmentation  of international  markets.  implications,  including  strategies  for efficiently
promoting  country  funds. For example:
They show that country  funds  traded in the
developed  capital markets  can help promote  the  *  In general,  introducing  the country  fund in
efficiency  of pricing  in the emerging  capital  the advanced  or developed  market increases  the
markets  and can enhance capital  mobilization  by  prices  of the underlying  component  assets traded
local firms. These  efficiency  gains vary depend-  in the originating  emerging  markets.
ing on the degree of the international  investor's
access  to the emerging  market  securities  (access  * As a policy matter,  country  funds that
effect), on the degree  to which  the industrialized  should be encouraged  by emerging  countries  for
countries' securities  market span th-1  securities  introduction  by fund  promoters  should  be
offered  in the emerging  markets  (substitution  targeted  to those local assets with imperfect  or
effect), and on the existing  cross-border  arbitrage  no substitutes  in the advanced  core markets.
restrictions.
* In some circumstances,  it may be socially
As a byproduct  of their analysis,  they  study  optimal  to subsidize  the introduction  of new
the reasons  why country  funds sell at a premium  funds  that are expected  to sell at a discount.
or discount  relative  to their net underlying  asset
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Appendices  41framework, we link the pricing of country funds in  the reference or
core  markets  (say the  US)  with  the  pricing  of  the  component
underlying  assets  (or net  asset  valuation)  in  the  originating
securities markets.  We study various scenarios of international
capital market structure and draw important implications for the
role of country funds in enhancing pricing efficiency in the local
securities  markets  and  capital  mobilization  by  local  firms.
Pricing efficiency is determined by the impact of the introduction
of country funds on the prices of the component assets traded in
local markets, and capital mobilization is  determined by the impact
on costs of capital facing local firms. The effects vary depending
on the market  segmentation structures considered.  Moreover, we
show that the  existence of premia  and discounts  on the country
funds depend  on the nature of market  segmentation and arbitrage
restrictions.
There are also important policy implications to be drawn from
our analysis. Country funds should obviously be encouraged under
those conditions where they contribute to capital mobilization and
pricing  efficiency  in  the  originating' capital  markets  and
economies.  However, not so obvious, we show that these efficiency
gains from country funds can be achieved despite their relatively
small  size.  This  is  important,  because  it  may  be  tempting  to
dismiss the role of country funds as insignificant due to their
small size relative to other external sources of funds.  Indeed,
the indeterminacy of size is  desirable for those emerging countries
which are concerned about extensive foreign ownership and about the
2THE PRICING OF COUNTRY FUNDS AND THEIR ROLE IN
CAPITAL MOBILIZATION FOR  EMERGING ECONOMIES
I.  Introduction
Closed-end national index funds (hereinafter "country funds")
primarily  invest  in  the  stocks  of  the  issuing  or  originating
countries, such as India, Korea, Brazil, and are typically
traded in the organized exchanges of the developed countries, such
as the US and the UK.  Country funds have expanded phenomenally
over the recent past (see  Figure 1), but they beg important issues
Figure 1
which are not sufficiently explored. Of particular interest to us
is their role in providing pricing efficiency in the originating
stock  markets  of  emerging  economies  and  enhancing  capital
mobilization  by  local  firms of  such  economies.  The  issues  of
pricing efficiency  and local capital mobilization  are of first-
order  importance,  since  country funds  themselves  remain  a very
small  fraction  of  the  stock  of  external  capital  available  to
emerging economies.'
Our purpose  here  is to provide  a  theoretical  analysis  of
country funds focusing on emerging economies whose capital markets
are not readily accessible to outside investors.  In a sequel paper
we provide an empirical analysis. By utilizing a segmented markets
'For  instance, the total initial  values of US-listed funds from
Brazil,  Chile,  and  Mexico  were  about  US  $150,  80.5,  and  266.7
million compared to $118.7, 19.4, and 100.4 billion, respectively,
of total external debt at the end of 1988.destabilizing  effects of "hot money".  Also,  our analysis calls
into question attempts to focus on widely  traded  securities  (or
"blue chips") in devising country funds, to the extent that these
securities are spannable by the international market, because the
greatest  impact of the country fund comes from those  securities
which  lack  ready  substitutes  in the  core  market.  We  point  out
strategies for  promoting desirable characteristics of country funds
as a byproduct of the analysis.
In drawing various implications, we look at three variations
of market segmentation structure and arbitrage restrictions.  One
relatively  clean  case  of  market  structure  that  we  consider
introduces capital inflow restrictions by emerging countries that
originate country funds, whereby the originating  capital markets
are restricted  to local investors, but that these  investors are
allowed to arbitrage freely between their markets and the core or
the reference markets in  which country funds are traded. We show  in
this case that there will be no premium or discount on the country
fund.  However,  the  prices  of  component  assets  traded  in  the
originating  markets will  be bid up to the  level of the country
funds,  resulting  in pricing  efficiency  and  enhanced  ability  of
firms to raise capital at more favorable terms (or  at reduced costs
of  capital).  We  then  consider  the  case  of  capital  inflow  and
prohibitive  restrictions  on  international  arbitrage  restriction
resulting  from  such  factors  as  absence  of  short  sales
opportunities,  taxes, borrowing constraints, and other investment
barriers.  In this case, there will be a premium on the country
3fund, and the pricing of the country  fund conforms to the core
market rather than the originating country.
In both of the above scenarios we assume that the country fund
serves as a perfeot substitute for the component securities, but,
in  fact,  that  may  not  be  the  case  for  a  number  of  emerging
countries.  This notion of imperfect substitution is reinforced by
a  plot  of  time  series  pattern  of country  funds  prices  and the
corresponding  net  asset  valuns  as  depicted  in  Figure  1.  This
motivates our third scenario where we now allow the possibilities
of imperfect substitution and imperfect arbitrage.
Figure 2
We  show that an interaction between the positive effect  of
enhanced access and the negative effect of imperfect substitution
delivers premium or discount on the country fund, depending on the
tradeoff.  Interestingly, though, the existence of a discount or
premium in itself cannot establish whether or not the introduction
of the country fund is welfare  improving from the standpoint of
emerging  economies.  We show that efficiency gains are possible
even  in  this  intermediate  case  of  imperfect  substitution,
regardless of the pricing relationship between price and net asset
value.  An  important factor we consider  in justifying  imperfect
substitution  is the notion  of excess  price  volatility  that  has
received ample attention recently.  This is because the component
assets  traded  in  the  originating  countries  are  fundamental  to
country funds traded in the core market, and excess  volatility is
measured by price volatility relative to fundamental volatility.
4This is also borne  out in Figure  2 and table  2.
The paper is organized  as follows.  Section II provides a
foundation  for  the  pricing  of country  funds  on the  basis  of recent
theoretical  advances  on  the  pricing  of  assets  in  segmented  markets.
The  segmented  market  approach  has  been  fruitfully  utilized  to  study
the effects of barriers  on asset  pricing and pricing of initial
public  offerings  and  securities  with  limited  followership.  Section
III posits  three  alternative  market  structures  for the trading  of
country  funds  and  their  underlying assets.  The  principal
contribution  of  the  paper  is  to  draw  important  implications  for  the
role of country funds in promoting pricing efficiency, local
capital  mobilization,  local  capital  market  development,  etc.  The
derivative  issues  of the existence  of fund  premia  and  optimal  size
of floatation  are also  examined  in this  section.  Some  extensions
of the analysis  are pursued  in Section  III.  Section  IV concludes
the  paper.
II.  Foundations  for  Country  Fund  Pricina
Our primary  goal is to study  the pricing impact  of country
funds  from the standpoint  of emerging  economies.  To do this,  we
begin  with  the  pricing  of  the  underlying  component  assets  traded  in
the  originating emerging  countries.  Actually  the  pricing
implications  in the context of advanced and readily accessible
markets are direct and should emerge dS  a special case of our
theoretical  analysis. Indeed,  in our framework  it can be readily
inferred  that the prices  of country  funds  should  converge  to the
5net asset  values  of the component  assets  if both  are traded  in an
integrated  market, and no premia/discounts  would be observed.
Thus,  the  study  of  the  country funds  originating from  the
restricted  securities  markets  is  more  challenging.  Our  approach  is
then to characterize  the price of a representative  portfolio  of
assets in a restricted  environment  as a starting  point and draw
implications  for  the introduction  for  three  distinct  scenarios  of
international  market  segmentation  and arbitrage  conditions.
A. Market Setting  for Trading of Country Funds and Their
underlying  securities
The  market  setting  follows  the  tradition  of  market
segmentation  as  posited  by  Lintner  (1971),  Rubinstein  (1973),  Glenn
(1976)  in  the  domestic  context,  and  by Black (1974),  Stulz (1991),
Errunza and Senbet (1981),  Errunza and Losq  (EL, 1985) in an
international  context. More recently  the structure  has been used
fruitfully  by Merton (1987)  and Mauer and Senbet (MS, 1992) to
study  the effects  of limited  followership  (imperfect  information)
and  the  underpricing anomaly  of  initial public  offerings,
respectively. 2 In  particular,  we find  it  convenient  to follow  the
approaches  of EL (1985)  and MS (1992),  although  their respective
motivations  are  different  from  our  paper. This  would  then  serve  as
a starting point in deriving relevant implications  for country
funds as we  study them for  alternative  variations of market
2  See  also Errunza (1991) for  a  similar application. A
variation  of this structure  is used  by Alexander,  et al (1987)  to
price  a  dually  listed  security  in  an otherwise  fully  segmented  two-
country setting, whereby investors have access only to  their
respective  markets.
6structure  and arbitrage  conditions.
Thus,  the  setting  is in  which  there  are  N  country  funds  traded
in the advanced  capital market, and the funds originate from N
emerging  economies. The advanced  reference  market  is denoted as
"core"  which is costlessly  accessed  by all investors  (T) in the
universe. The emerging  originatiiig  markets  are accessible  only  to
local  investors,  and  hence  they  are  completely  segmented  from  each
other. However,  there  is  partial  segmentation  between  the  core  and
each  of the emerging  markets  in the sense  that investors  from  the
originating  countries  have access  to the core.
For  an analytical  convenience  we deal  with  only  one  restricted
asset  for  the  most  part  of our  initial  analysis,  accessible  only  to
N (M  <  T) local  investors  in  the  restricted  emerging market. This
representation  of the market  structure  is simple  and it captures
the focal issues  in a reasonable  way.  In fact,  as we shall see
later  it  is  rich  enough to  generate important implications
regarding  country  funds.,  The implications  for the country funds
arise from the  recognition that the model for  an  individual
restricted  asset is applicable  to a collection  or a portfolio  of
restricted  assets  which  can be viewed  as component  assets  to the
fund.
B. Technology
We treat  the risky  securities  of  the core  market (say  the US)
as  an aggregate  index  with  the  end-of-period  cash  flow  specified  in
terms  of multiple  factors  as follows:
7where
Yc  the core  market's  end-of-period  cash flow
Vc  - the expected  value  of  Yc
FK =  the kth economic  factor
pa=  the core market asset sensitivity to the kth economic
factor
e=  the residual  core  market  cash  flow
We also invoke  standard  orthogonality  conditions  such  that
E(FK)  =  E(ek)  = E(CFK)  =  E(FKFI)  =  0
This is a two-date  or single  period framework  in which the
final date cash flows specified above include the liquidation
proceeds.  As  a  reference point we  consider an  asset  in a
restricted emerging market which is accessed only by M  local
investors, but  its  cash  flow has  a  stochastic technological
relationship  with the assets  in the core  market.  In general  the
relationship  is  such  that  the  asset  is  not  perfectly  spanned  by the
8core  assets;  that is,  it  does  not  have  a perfect  substitute  in the
core market.  We posit the spanning relationship  following  MS
(1992),  whereby the restricted  asset's  terminal  cash flow can be
stated  as:
~~~  +8~~~~~~,  ~~(2) YF SY+IPF1YC  XEJ1  +e-F(2
or alternatively
Y,=SYD+PFE  PCvFk+IPFeC+eF  (3)
where
A-CK  =  the sensitivity  of the  restricted  market  asset  to the
kth economic  factor
SF  - the  component  of  the  restricted  asset  cash  flow
unspanned  by the core  market
E(ep)  =  E(8eep)  - E(ePFK)  =0.
A similar spanning relationship  follows for the remaining
restricted  assets  from  the other  N - 1  emerging  countries;  we can
again  think  of them in an aggregate  for  the purpose  of cash flow
specification. Thus, the aggregate  cash flows  for the remaining
group  of restricted  assets  can be specified  as:
9YW=YW+pjV  fCKFKr+pwc  *+ew  (4)
where
flwf  =  the sensitivity of the aggregate cash flows for
the assets of the rest of the restricted markets to
the kth economic factor
w=  the component of the restricted asset cash flows
unspanned by the core market
E(ew) =  E(eew)  =  E(epFK)  =0.
For completeness, we also recognize a spanning relationship
existing  between  the reference  restricted  security  (F) and the
aggregate (W)  of the remaining restricted assets from N-1 emerging
countries; recognizing  this particular spanning relationship, we
can restate the cash flows for the restricted asset:
Yp= IYP  F(  PC  K+CC) I+ ITF*+bFeW+eF*]  (5)
K
The cash flows are split into those spanned by the core market
(first square parenthesis] and those "core unspanned" or specific
to the asset  (second square parenthesis].  The latter parenthesis
recognizes there  is a spanning relationship between the  "  core-
10unspanned" and the remaining aggregate of restricted assets, with
a factor of proportionality  bp and the unique residual el*.  The
specification in (5) will be useful later in our attempt to make
predictions  about the  impact of introducing a new generation of
country funds on the discounts/premia of the existing funds.
C.  Portfolio and Market Equilibria
The  technological  specifications  are  adaptations  of  the
frameworks utilized by MS  (1992) in the context of underpricing
anomaly of initial  public offerings and by EL (1985)  in  the context
of international asset pricing.  While our motivation is specific
to pricing of country funds, our basic environmental specification
is similar to the earlier works motivated by different economic
phenomena, particularly that of  MS (1992)  on the pricing of initial
public  offerings  in  the  domestic  market  and  of  EL  (1985)  on
international asset pricing under segmented  markets.  Consequently,
the initial valuation that we wish to use as a starter follows from
these works, and we will state it without proof.  [See Appendix I
for detailed proof along the lines of MS (1992)].
The approach is fairly standard in that individual investors
are  allowed  to  optimize  their  portfolio  choices  by  picking
fractional holdings in  various categories of assets, depending upon
accessibility of these assets.  The efficient portfolio optimization
is in  a mean-variance paradigm,  whereby individuals maximize their
utility over current consumption, the expected value of portfolio
wealth  (or  equivalently expected consumption) at a final date, and
portfolio risk as reflected in  the volatility of future consumption
11at  a  final  date. Portfolio  demands  are  then  aggregated  and  equated
to aggregate existing supply of securities  to derive a market
equilibrium  valuation.  Note that the aggregation  process takes
explicit  account  of limited  access,  or alternatively  as in Merton
(1987)  the  Lagrgange  multipliers  are  used  to  measure  a  shadow  price
of  imperfect access.  However, the  model delivers the  same
structure  under  either  treatment  of  access  restrictions.  Thus,  the
value  of a restricted  asset  can be specified  as:
Tvp= (i+x,)  -1 Tp-@-e- (ppz)  - ("  -1  (bp2(2  (eW)  +C °  (eF*)  (6)
where
z  =  (1  + 6p  + #w)(3tCj 2U2(F)  + o2(eC)]
The valuation  in (6)  recognizes  that  there  is also  risk-free
lending  and  borrowing  available  to  all  participants  at  a rate  equal
to rf3.  The risk  premium  is of two forms:-  a) complete  price risk
premium which  is a  function of  Z, and  b) the  risk premium
associated  with limited  risk  sharing  or nationalistic  risk factor
which  is  shared  only  by local  investors.  The  complete  pricing  risk
factor is subject to the universal  price of risk, 94, and the
nationalistic  risk  factor  is subject  to(OM)-l.
3This assumption  may turn out to be important,  because we
remark  later  that  the differential  interest  rates (in  real terms)
across  national  boundaries  may alone  generate  premia/discounts  on
the country  funds.  This is particularly  so if the interest  rate
markets  are segmented,  along  with  the stock  markets  which are our
focus  in this  paper.
12The nationalistic risk factor is separately priced only due to
limited risk sharing resulting from limited  access.  If access were
complete, the model converges to the familiar capital asset pricing
model, where the reference benchmark portfolio is  the international
portfolio.  Also, if the restricted asset had a perfect substitute
in the core market, it would be priced as an unrestricted  asset
with  identical characteristics.  The two important dimensions  -
access  and  substitution effects - can be dramatized  if we make
additional restrictions without much loss  of generality.  Following
Merton  (1987) and MS  (1992), if we assume individuals everywhere
have identical preferences and initial wealth, we can express the
degree  of  access  and  substitution  effects  more  explicitly  as
follows:
VF=  (1+F)(rfl-(y/T)  (PZ+b02(e2)o2(CF*)  )2
(7)
-(y/  T [bo202(e.)+Co2(eF*)  -))
a
The interaction between the degree of access and substitution
effects are reflected in the last term of the model.  The degree of
access is  now measured by a  =  the number of investors accessing the
security (M)  /the number of all investors in the universe  (T).  The
universal risk aversion measure or "price  of risk" is given by 7/T,
while the nationalistic price of risk is  given by 7/aT.  The latter
is greater than the former to the extent that a  <  1, reflecting the
13extra  risk premium  demanded  by local investors  due to incomplete
risk sharing.  Note that if the "core-unspanned"  risk  (or the
volatility  of the  unspanned  cash  flows  in (5))  were  zero,  which  is
the case  under the existence  of perfect  substitutes  in the core,
the last  term  would  collapse  to zero.  In that  case the effect  of
limited  access  is undone,  because investors  can achieve  complete
hedging by  taking long and  short positions in the  core  and
restricted  markets.
In the following  section  we shall link the pricing of the
restricted  assets in the emerging  countries  with the pricing  of
country funds  in  the  core  market.  Under three  alternative
structures  of market segmentation  and arbitrage conditions,  we
derive  various  implications  by  using  the  model  in (7)  as a  starting
point.  The principal contribution  of this paper hinges upon
developing  appropriate  theoretical  implications  to explain some
important  issues  surrounding  country  funds - pricing efficiency,
local  capital  mobilization,  the existence  of premia/discounts  on
country  funds,  and some policy implications  for  promoting  funds,
etc.
III.  The Efficiency  Role of Country  Funds  for Emerging  Markets
The model in (7)  can also be used to price a portfolio  of
restricted  foreign  assets.  In the parlance  of country  funds,  the
price of such a portfolio  is the net asset value of the fund.
Hereinafter  we reinterpret  asset  F as a portfolio  of the  component
assets  underlying  the country  fund. We can  restate  the net asset
14value in an implicit  functional  form:
VI  =  fEY,Z,IC,o 2 (eF)]  (8)
where
=  Expected  portfolio  cash flow  at the final  date
Z  =  The complete  pricing or spanning  risk subject to the
aggregate  international  price  of risk (9'  =  7/T)
a  =  The  degree  of  access,  wherein  a=1  denotes  complete  access
02(cp)  =  The unspanned risk factor subject to the nationalistic
price  of risk [(O)-'  =  -y/aT];  Also the degree  of
substitution,  wherein  0 2(8F)  - 0 denotes  perfect
substitution
T  =  Number  of investors  in the entire  universe,  including
both  the core  and restricted  local  markets
Now we are ready to analyze the impact of introducing  a
country fund in the core (say  the US) market.  We look  at three
variations  of  market  segmentation structure  and  arbitrage
rest  ctions.  Throughout  we maintain  a mildly segmented  market
structure in the sense that investors in the local, emerging
economies  are  unrestricted,  but investors  from  the advanced,  core
15markets  are  restricted  from holding  securities  in the  emerging
economies  directly.  Thus,  restrictions  are  imposed  on capital
inflows, but not on outflows,  into the emerging economies.  The
three cases we consider are:
Model I:  Restricted arbitrage by local investors and perfect
substitution between the country fund and the portfolio  of
component securities
Model  II:  Unrestricted  arbitrage  by  local  investors  and
perfect substitution
Model  IXI:  Unrestricted  arbitrage  by  local  investors and
imperfect substitution
our goal under each scenario or m.el  is to analyze the impact
that country funds have in a) enhancing efficiency of pricing in
the  originating,  emerging  markets  [pricing  efficiency],  b)
enhancing the ability of local firms to mobilize capital at more
favorable  terms  (or  reduced  costs  of  capital)  [capital
mobilization], c) enhancing development  of local capital markets
[market development]. The second round of implications relate to
the existence of premium or discount on the country fund under each
scenario and efficient strategies for the promotion of the country
fund in the core.  Table 1 outlines the three alternative market
structures and the associated implications. The empirical analogs
of these issues are pursued in a sequel paper.
Table 1
16A. Model  I
We begin with a simple  case of market segmentation,  where
investors in the emerging  markets face a ban or restri:tion  on
cross-border  arbitrage  between  the  country  fund  and its component
assets, although the country fund is presumed to be a perfect
substitute  in terms of cash flow (technological  uncertainty)  for
the  cash flows of the portfolio of the component securities.
Investors  in the emerging  countries  are unable  to undo the price
differential  between the country fund and its net asset value
through  arbitrage  operations.  The  sense  in  which  there  is
restriction  on arbitrage  may arise  from  the  absence  of short-sales
or differential  tax penalties  (e.g.,  Germany;  see  the appendix  on
taxes), or that there is limited  supply of funds  due to control
considerations.
Proposition  1
The  introduction  of a country fund has no impact on the
pricing of the component assets in the local market, but the
country  fund  sells  at a premium  relative  to its  net asset  value.
Proof
Recognizing  that  a  country  fund  is  an  unrestricted  asset  which
was  previously  restricted,  its  risk  is  now  subject  to  the  universal
price of risk  ('y/T). In other words, it will be priced with
complete  access (a=l)  so that
VP= (1 +rf)  -l  Y5t  (PPZ+bp1  2 (eV)  +72  (e)  (9)
17where
Vp  =  the price of a country fund
In  the  absence  of  cross-border  arbitrage,  the  restricted  asset
will  have its  entire  risk,  including  the  spanning  risk,  subject  to
the  nationalistic  price  of  risk;  the  country  fund  and  the  portfolio
of restricted  component  assets  will  have  differential  value,  with
the net asset  value  expressed  as:
VF*= (1+rf)  1 (Y-.IY  (3pFZ+bF02  (ew)  +q2 (eF*))]  (10) 'cT
Comparing  (9)  with (101,  the  country  fund  price  =  Vp  >  Vp  =  the
net asset value, since y/T <  y/aT.  The risk premium would be
larger  for  the  restricted  security,  as  the  cash  flow  uncertainty  is
identical  for both the country  fund  and the component  securities
(by  assumption  of  perfect  substitution).  Consequently,  the  country
fund  sells  at a premium  over  the net asset  value.  Q.Z.D.
Under this market  structure  the introduction  of the country
fund  in the core  market  is of  no consequence  to the  pricing  of the
component  assets  in the restricted  emerging  market  from  which the
fund  originates,  although  there  may  be diversification  gain  to the
core (international)  investors  through  their  holdings  of the fund.
Indeed,  the  country  fund  and  its  component  assets  will  be  priced  as
though  they are completely  segmented,  where  the price  of risk for
the country  fund  conforms  to the  price  of risk  in the core (host)
18market, whereas the price of risk  for the  underlying assets
conforms  to the market  in the originating  country.  They plot on
two different security market lines, so to speak.  This is a
subject  of  our empirical  analysis,  since  this  case  establishes  the
possibility  that  prices  of  certain  funds  behave  so  as to  "resemble"
their hosts rather  than their origins.  Nonetheless,  there is a
premium  on the country  fund  relative  to its  net asset  value.  It
should  be  noted  here  that  the  existence  of premia  on  country  funds
is un-informative  about their efficiency  gains to the emerging
economies  as this  particular  structure  illustrates. The next  two
cases or models admit the possibility  of such efficiency  gains;
indeed,  under model II below  there are important  gains from the
introduction  of the country fund, yet  the fund sells at zero
premium.
B. Model II
This model, like Model I, allows  the country fund to be a
perfect substitute for  the  underlying assets  traded  in  the
originating  market.  Although, this is a case of two perfect
substitutes  trading in two different  locations,  investors  in the
core markets  of the developed  world are prevented  from accessing
the  emerging  markets  from  which  the  country  funds  originate. As we
see below this capital inflow restriction  is inconsequential,
because  the pricing  differential  will be eliminated  by virtue  of
unimpeded arbitrage by  local investors from  the  originating
countries.
19Prgposition  2 (Pricing  EffiCiency  and Capital  Mobilization)
The introduction  of a country  fund  enhances  the value of the
component  assets in the originating  country,  and hence enhances
local  capital  mobilization.
Proof:
The  price  of  a  country  fund  exceeds  the  (pre-fund
introduction)  net asset  value  in (7)  or (8),  because  7/T  <  7/aT.
Q.E.D.
Corollary I
Ceteris  paribus,  greater  outside  access  enhances  the  value  of
a  restricted  security  at  a  decreasing  rate. However,  with  complete
access  of the country  fund in the core, the fund trades  at zero
premium.
P-roof
Taking  the  first  and  second  derivatives  of (7)  with  respect  to
the degree  of access (a),
VI  (a) ()b2Ca2(eV)+C2  (el,*)  ](1/a2)  (1  +r.)-1  (1
T
and
Vp((cc)  =-  [2  ( Y)  [b2C2  (eW) +o2 (e,*)  ]  (1/a 3 )  (1+.r)  -l  (12)
T
Given, though,  that the country  fund is trading now in the
core with  complete access (a=i), the net  asset value of the
20component,  underlying  assets  will  be bid  up to  VFI= VP,  because  of
Derfe_t  substitution  between  the  fund  and  the component  assets  and
perfect cross-border  arbitrage  by local  investors.  Consequently,
there  will be no premium  or discount  on the fund.
Q.E.D.
Implications  of  Model II
1) Pricing  Efficiency:  There is pricing  efficiency  in the
sense  that  the  prices  of  the  component securities in  the
originating  countries  (i.e.,  emerging  economies)  rise,  on average,
upon  the introduction  of the  country  fund. Thus,  the  country  fund
serves  as a mechanism  to complete  the market.
2)  Local  Capital  Mobilization  and  Capital  Market  Development:
Firms  in  the  originating  (emerging)  countries  can  now  raise  capital
locally  at more favorable  terms (i.e.,  at increased  prices  or at
reduced costs of capital).  Thus, the introduction  of country
funds,  apart  from  generating  external  capital  directly,  can  enhance
local  capital  mobilization. This in turn enhances  local  capital
market  development  or expansion  as more local  firms are able to
access  the  market,  leading  to increased  efficiency  and  development
of the local  economies  of the emerging  countries.
3)  Optimal  Size  of Floatation:  Country  funds  can  achieve  the
desirable  goals  of  pricing  efficiency  for  local  capital  markets  and
enhanced capital mobilization locally without direct foreign
ownership  or the destabilizing  effects  of "hot money" associated
with international  capital.  Without countervailing  costs, the
21efficiency  gains of the country fund can be obtained with its
minimal  size  so long  as it spans  the component  securities  fuliy  in
the core  market 4.
Of course, the developing  economies  are concerned  not only
about  pricing  efficiency  and local  capital  mobilization,  but also
about  the volume  of external  funds  raised.  However,  the current
level  of country  funds  constitute  only  a  minuscule  fraction  of the
total external  sources of capital for developing  economies {see
footnote l}, and it might be argued on this basis that country
funds  are economically  insignificant. Our analysis  suggests  the
contrary  in the sense  that  they could  have enormous  impact  on the
efficiency  of  pricing  local  securities  and  local  capital
mobilization  irrespective  of their  size.
The  efficiency  gains  come  about  as local  investors  are  able  to
reduce, and as the core investors increase,  their holdings of
domestic  risks. This  is  achieved  in  two  ways: first,  investors  in
the  core  market  can  now  hold local  risk  by buying  into  the country
fund. Second,  local  investors  can  short  sell  the fund  and acquire
core assets with the  proceeds.  The  important point is that
unrestricted trade  in  local risk  becomes possible with  the
establishment  of  a  country  fund  of any  size  when  domestic  investors
are able  to short  sell  the fund  in  the core  market. It is because
'The foreign ownership control could be achieved directly
through  restriction  on  equity  ownership.  However,  the  country  fund
traded  in the core  market (with  complete  access)  accomplishes  the
same  purpose while  enhancing pricing efficiency and  capital
mobilization,  whereas  restricted  equity  portion  is traded  as part
of the restricted  foreign  security.
22of this property  that the  fund size is indeterminant.  In this
sense,  country  funds  are  like  flagships  in  the  core  market,
providing  reliable  information  on  the  evolving  price  of  a
particular risk dimension.
4) Discount/Premium:  Since the net asset value based on the
component assets traded  in the emerging economy is bid up to the
same level as the price  of the country fund traded  in the core
market, the premium/discount on the fund, Vp-Vp*,is  zero.  Thus, the
country fund need not originate from a capital market (say  UK) that
is  fully integrated into the international  market to sell at a zero
price differential relative to its net asset value.
C. Model III
This scenario or model admits imperfect substitution, and it
is perhaps the most realistic of the models considered.  The two
previous  models  allow  the  country  fund  to  serve  as  a  perfect
substitute  for  its underlying  component assets  (in a  portfolio
sense).  As  Model  II  demonstrates,  this  notion  of  perfect
substitution has important  welfare implications for  the originating
emerging countries even when there are restrictions on the inflows
of capital  into those  countries.  However, under Model  I these
desirable properties of the introduction of the country fund are
impeded by restrictions on cross-border arbitrage.
Imperfect  substitution  between  the  country  fund  and  the
underlying assets traded in the emerging countries may arise from
23a number of factors, including but not limited to, a) sovereign
risk exposure for holders of country funds, such as the possibility
of  exchange  control,  b)  exchange  risk  arising  from  market
conditions and the use of differential numeraire5,  c) noise trading
and excess  volatility 6. As mentioned  earlier,  there  is evidence
that  time  series  behavior  of  fund  prices  (and the  associated
volatility) differs from that of the net asset values  (see Figure
1 and table 2). The volatility is higher for fund pricep and this
Table 2
divergence appears larger for less developed economies. This gives
credence to this case under investigation, which is based on the
notion of imperfect substitution.
Proposition 3
The introduction of a country fund in  the core market enhances
the value of the component assets traded in restricted, emerging
markets, but it delivers either premium or discount on the country
5  Under  a  different  numeraire  for  translating  cash  flows
holders  of  the  country  fund and  the  component  assets  may  face
divergent or heterogeneous expectations, resulting in differential
valuations for the two classes of investments and hence premia or
discount on the fund.  Note it is not true that exchange risk leads
to a premium necessarily, because exchange rates could fluctuate
favorably so as to serve as a hedge  (say negative exchange risk
"beta") to actually generate a discount.
6  The notion  of excess volatility  fits  in well  with  such
studies  as  Summers  (1986)  and  Shiller  (1981)  who  claim  that
observed  price  volatility  is excessively  high  relative  to  its
fundamental  counterpart.  Under  our  framework  the  component
securities are fundamental to the country fund securities.
24fund.
Proof
Consider  a  new  spanning  (albeit  imperfect  substitution)
relationship between the component assets and the country fund now
in the core market
ep=bp*ep+ep**  (13)
where
ep  =  the component of the country fund cash flow unspanned by
the core market
el,..  =  the  component of  the  underlying asset cash  flow
unspanned by the country fund
Rewriting  (9) to recognize the possibility  of divergence in
the volatilities of the country fund and the underlying assets
v"=  (1  +  rf)  -1 [YF_.  (pPZ+02 (ep))  J  (14)
where  it  is  assumed  that  complete  pricing  risk  factor  (Z) is
unchanged,  but there  is divergence in the unspanned  risks  (i.e.
there is differential in the component risks of the fund and its
underlying  assets unspanned by the core market).  The degree  of
substitution between the unspanned risks can be characterized as
A =  b 2*a 2 (_p)1/a2(e  ).
It also  follows that the net  asset value  of tAe component
securities is:
25v* *=  (1  +z  )  -1  [Vp-  Y  (PpNZ+bF2  a2 (ep)  )  - T2(F*  (15)
Comparing  (15)  with (7)  or (8),  we see  that  V.*  >  V.,  because
only a component  of the previously  unspanned  risk, ca 2(a**), is
subject  to  the  nationalistic  price  of  risk  upon  the  introduction  of
the country  fund  in the core  market.  Consequently,  the net asset
value increases  in spite of imperfect  substitution  or imperfect
spanning  relationship  between  the country  fund  and its underlying
assets  traded  in the emerging  market.  Comparing  (15)  with (14),
though,  Vp  - V,*  can be positive or negative, or it is possible for
the country  fund  to sell  at either  a discount  or premium.
Q.E.D
Implicatigns  of ModelIII
1) Pricing  Efficiency:  There is increased pricing efficiency
in the sense  that  the local  security  prices  get bid up to reflect
the fact  that  a larger  component  of the asset  risks  are  subject  to
the  universal  price  of  risk. This  efficiency  effect  is similar  to
the implication  in (1)  of Model  II.  We can be more precise  about
the determinants  of the efficiency  ("welfare")  gain by stating  it
more explicitly  as
Q  =  y/T(l/a  - 1)Xa 2(e)  =  f  (Risk Unspannable  by  the  Core,
Differential  Between  Local Price  of Risk and Universal
Price of Risk, the Degree  of Substitution  between the
Fund  and the Underlying  Assets).
26Other things being equal, emerging countries with  larger
unspannable  risk  benefit  more  from  the introduction  of the  country
fund  in  the core (advanced)  market. Such  countries  typically  have
idiosyncratic  investment  opportunities  or  unique  natural  resources.
At the limit,  of course,  the effect  is nil if either (a)X  =  0, or
(b)a  =  1.  Also,  other  things  being  equal,  the gain is larger  if
the  local price of risk  is higher relative to the  world or
universal  price  of risk,  which  may be the case for small  emerging
markets  with limited  risk-sharing  opportunities. This effect is
reflected  in  a. Finally,  a  greater  substitutability  of the  country
fund  and  its  underlying  assets  increases  the  efficiency  gain. This
iffect  increases  with X.
2)  Capital Mobilization and  Capital Market Development:
Similar  to  Model  II,  local  firms  can  raise  capital  more
advantageously  at reduced  costs  of capital.  Thus,  increased  local
capital  mobilization  and local  market  development  are  possible  due
to the introduction  of the fund  in the core  market.
3)  Due  to  imperfect substitution, though,  the  pricing
efficiency  and capital  mobilization  effects of the country fund
are smaller than their analogs in Model II.  It is, therefore,
advisable  to  introduce  policies  that  reduce  imperfect
substitutability  of the country fund and its component assets
traded  in the originating  country (see  below).
4) The entire  discussion  relating  to the optimal  size  of the
country fund  floatation under Model  II  applies here.  (See
implication  # 3 of Model II above).
275) PremiUM/Disoount:  The country fund sells either at a
premium or discount.  That is, Vp -Vp*  is  positive or negative.  To
see this, it should  be recognized  that,  with the introduction  of
the country fund, both access  and substitution  effects bear on
pricing. The  degree  of access  is assumed  complete  for  the country
fund (a=l),  and hence resulting in a positive pricing effect.
However,  the imperfect  substitution  may be such  that a2 (ep)  <  or >
a2(ep). If  the  country  fund  prices  become  more  volatile,  then  there
is a negative pricing effect.  In the event that the negative
substitution  effect  more than offsets  the positive  access  effect,
the fund  sells  at discount.
6)  Is Fund  Discount/Premium  an  Appropriate Predictor of
Efficiency  Gains  to the  originating  Countries?  Model  III  makes  it
evident  that  the  positive  pricing  efficiency  and  capital
mobilization effects are  achieved irsespective  of  the  fund's
premium  or  discount. With  imperfect  substitution,  one  cannot  infer
the advantages  of the introduction  of a country fund by merely
observing  whether  it is  selling  at a  discount  or premium. Actually
as shown  in Model  I, fund  premium  can occur  even  when its  role is
inconsequential  to local  asset  pricing  and capital  mobilization.
7) The Country Fund Factor:  Under imperfect  substitution
stemming  from additional  factors affecting  country fund prices,
there is now  an  additional pricing factor common to  certain
segments  of the country  funds.  In the language  of the arbitrage
pricing theory  (APT), this  factor conforms  neither  to  the
originating countries  nor  to  the  reference  countries. The
28additional  factor  is  analogous  to  the  risk  factors  in  (3),
exclusive of the complete pricing risk, rZ.  This prediction  is a
basis for our empirical analysis based on the country fund index.
IV.  Extensions
The  preceding  analysis  has  focused  primarily  on  the  risk
dimension  and  incomplete  risk  sharing  in  an  international
environment  characterized with  investor restrictions.  However,
there  are  significant cases where country funds trade at a discount
even  when they do not originate from countries with limited capital
and  inflow  restrictions.  As  a  starter,  this  observation  is
consistent with long-standing anomaly that closed-end funds trade
typically at a discount even when they trade in  the domestic market
(e.g., closed-end  funds traded  in the United  States).  In this
section,  we  wish  to  catalogue  additional  factors  that  have  a
bearing on the pricing of country funds relative to their net asset
values. These  additional  factors of interest will  be used  in a
sequel empirical paper in explaining cross-sectional variations in
country fund returns and premia or discounts.
A. Interest Rate Differential.  The preceding analysis assumed
that investors faced the same real rate of interest across national
boundaries.  This may  not hold between pairs  of countries  with
differential creditworthiness such that the induced interest rate
differential between the core market and the originating emerging
country  may  deliver  discount  or  premium  on  the  country  fund
originating from the latter country.  Suppose that the core country
29is  the  US  and  the  emerging  country is  Brazil  with  lower
creditworthiness  and  higher  real  rate  of interest.  This  may alone
deliver a premium on the Brazilian fund, since the underlying
securities  traded  in  Brazil  are  presumably  discounted  by  Brazilians
at  a higher  rate  than  the  rate  applicable  to the  country  fund  by US
investors.
The  preceding  argument  is  incomplete, though,  because
Brazilian  investors  may fully  access  the US risk-free  government
securities  and hence face  the same benchmark  rate of interest  as
investors  in the US for lending  purposes.  In addition,  they may
use  the  US asset  investments  as  e  collateral  for  borrowing  purposes
in the event that credit  enforcement  is an issue.  Thus, in the
absence of investor  restrictions  leading  to segmentation  in the
international  money  markets,  the interest  rate differential  alone
may not deliver  a price  differential  on the country  fund  relative
to its  net asset  value. Moreover,  the interest  rate  differential
may reflect  country  risk differential,  affecting  the core market
discount  rate  applicable  to the country  fund.  While  the interest
rate differential  between  Brazil  and the US may alone lead to a
premium,  the  country  risk  factor  leads  to a  discount  that  reflects
the  risk  of expropriation  of  the foreign  portfolio  investors.  When
the probability  of expropriation  is low, which is likely when
country  funds  are small,  a  premium  may emerge. At any  rate,  it is
difficult to  determine the  net  effect of  the  interest rate
differential  on the price of the fund relative  to its net asset
value.
30B. TM  -and Regulatory  Factors. Our analysis  thus  far  has  not
explicitly  considered  the impact  of the tax treatment  of country
funds,  although  implicit  in Model  III  above  is the possibility  of
differential  tax  treatment  rendering  imperfect  substitution  between
the  country fund and  the  component securities traded in the
originating  countries.  A  stylized description of the US tax
treatment  of country  funds  is provided  in Appendix  II.  The impact
of tax treatment  can be appreciated  just  on the basis  of the  most
straightforward  case  defined  as follows:
1.  The fund  qualifies  as a  Regulated  Investment  Co. (IRC)  and
hence  subject  to no corRorate  taxatign.
2) All distributions  of net investment income (dividends,
interest,  net short-term  capital  gains,  etc.,)  are taxable  at an
ordinary  personal  ta  rate.  (Note:  Tazes  are imposed  even  when
income  is reinvested].
3) Foreign  withholding  taxes  and foreign  income  taxes  paid  by
the fund  are treated  as paid  bY shareholders  who then  claim  these
as credits/deductions  for  US tax purposes (US  is the host country
here).
Under  the above  scenario  the  controlling  tax rate  on the fund
income  is the US income  tax rate.  If the controlling  tax rate is
identical  to  the foreign  (originating  country)  tax  rate,  there  will
be no tax-induced  differential  between  the fund  price  and its  net
asset  value. Note  that  the  net  asset  value  is impacted  only  by the
foreign taxes imposed on component assets in the  originating
country. Thus,  the  premium/discount  =  f(US/foreign  income  tax  rate
31differential)7.
C.  Optimality of Country Fund Size.  As discussed in the last
section,  the  efficiency gains  of  local  asset pricing  and  local
capital mobilization can be achieved with a minimal size of country
fund flotation.  (See implication #  3  of Models  II and III).  In
other  words,  without  some  countervailing  forces  against  the
efficiency  gains  of  a  country  fund,  its  optimal  size  is
indeterminate.
One  countervailing  force  is the possibility  of passing  up
valuable investment opportunities due to local capital shortage.
This calls for raising funds externally, thus resorting to the use
of  country  funds  for  that  purpose.  Thus,  optimal  size  =
f(Efficiency  gains,  economic  colonization  (foreign  control),
external  capital  mobilization).  Since  efficiency  gains  from
pricing and capital mobilization can be achieved at any size, the
optimal country fund size is determined by equating the marginal
benefit  of external  capital mobilization  and  the marginal  cost
associated with diminished ownership control.
V.  Conclusions and Policy laplications
Our analysis shows that country funds traded in the developed
'In  some cases the tax treatment is complex  (e.g., Germay),
affecting the extent to which investors engage in arbitrage.  Thus,
Model I discussed earlier may follow from tax-related impediments
to  the  arbitrage  process.  Rather  than  treating  regulatory  and  tax
factors  as  separate  predictors  of  pricing,  one  could  view  them  as
engendering  imperfect  substitution.  That  way  the  model  can
accommodate  them  in  its  current  structural  form.  For  instance,
sovereign  risk  may  impact  the  substitution  effect negatively.
32capital  markets can be beneficial  in promoting  the efficiency  of
pricing in the emerging  capital  markets and in enhancing  capital
mobilization  by local  firms  of the originating  countries.  These
gains vary depending upon the degree of international  investor
access  to the  emerging  markets  (access  effect),  the  degree  to  which
the core or advanced  market  securities  span  the securities  in the
emerging  markets (substitution  effect),  and  cross-border  arbitrage
restrictions.
The  issue of  the country fund selling at a  discount or
premium,  relative  to its  underlying  asset  value,  is  only  derivative
in  our framework. Even  when  the  country  fund  sells  at a discount,
there  can  be  efficiency gains  to  emerging economies.  One
particular  model structure  that we consider,  which may deliver  a
discount,  is based  on imperfect  substitution  between  the country
fund  returns  (as  generated  in  the  advanced  core  market)  and  the
underlying  asset  returns  (as  generated  in  the  originating,  emerging
market)  stemming  from  the notion  of excess  price volatility (or
noise  trading)  relative  to  fundamental  volatility.  We emphasize
that  the  component  assets  traded  in  the  originating  countries  are
fundamental  to  country  funds  traded  in  the  core  advanced  market.
Thus,  we  can  outline  the  main  conclusions  and  policy
implications  that  can be drawn  in  general  as  follows.
1.  Pricing  Bfficiency  and Resource  Mobilization
In  general,  the  introduction  of  the  country  fund  in  the
advanced  or  developed  market  increases  the  prices  of  the  underlying
component  assets  traded  in  the  originating  emerging  markets. Thus,
33the country  fund  promotes  pricing  efficiency  in  the emerging  local
markets,  since  the  country  fund,  in  a sense,  serves  as a  mechanism
to complete the international  markets.  As a corollary to the
pricing efficiency  gain, the introduction  of the country fund
promotes local  capital or resource  mobilization  in the sense of
making it possible  for local  firms in the emerging (originating)
countries  to raise capital  at more favorable  terms or at reduced
discount  rates  in  the local  capital  markets. This  in  turn  enhances
local  capital  market  development  or expansion  as more local  firms
are  able  to  access  the  equity  market. Increased  pricing  efficiency
should lead to increased economic development  of the emerging
economies.
Given  that  the local  capital  markets  have  restricted  access,
the  specific determinants of the pricing efficiency gains to
emerging  capital  markets  and  resource  mobilization  by local  firms
are  (a) the risks of the  local assets constituting the  fund
unspanned  by the core financial  market in the developed  world in
which  the fund  is traded,  (b)  the  differential  between  local  price
of risk and universal price of risk, and  (c) the  degree of
substitution  between  the fund  and the underlying  assets  traded  in
the originating (emerging)  markets. Other things being equal,
emerging  countries  with larger  unspannable  risk  benefit  more from
the  introduction  of  the  country  fund  in  the  core (advanced)  market.
Such  countries  typically  have  idiosyncratic  investment
opportunities  or unique  natural  resources. Moreover,  the gain is
larger  if the local  price  of risk is  higher  relative  to the  world
34or universal price of risk, which may be the case for thinly
capitalized  emerging  markets  with  limited  risk-sharing
opportunities.  Finally,  a  greater  substitutability  of the country
fund and  its underlying  assets increases  the efficiency gain.
Conversely, the  gain  is  smaller if  country fund prices are
excessively  volatile relative to fundamental  volatility  of the
component  assets  traded  in the emerging  markets.
2.  Efficient  Promotion  of Country lunds  anG a Case  for  Price
Stabilization
As a policy  matter,  country  funds,  that should  be encouraged
by  emerging  countries  for  introduction  by fund  promoters,  should  be
targeted  to those  local  assets  with imperfect  or  no substitutes  in
the  advanced  core  mark.  vs. Of course,  the  objective  of efficiency
gains  for  the emerging  economies  may  be not be consistent  with  the
objectives  of the fund  promoters. In a sequel  paper  we will  have
an empirical  evidence suggesting  that the actual choice of the
underlying  securities  is too conservative  with excessive  usage  of
"blue  chips". We reach  this  conclusion  by comparing  the residual
volatilities  of  the  component  assets  in  the  country  funds  and  those
of the assets  in the local  market.
Imperfect substitution  between the country fund and the
component assets  traded in  the  local markets mitigates the
.efficiency  gains.  We have evidence  that  the country fund  prices
are  excessively  volatile relative to their net asset values,
suggesting  imperfect  substitution.  Given  that  the  component  assets
are fundamental  to  the country  fund,  the excess  volatility  fits  in
35with an accumulation  of the literature  on excess volatility  and
noise  trading.  Consequently,  excess  volatility  detracts  from  the
benefits of the country fund in undoing the effects of limited
access  to the emerging  markets.  As a policy  implication,  a case
can be made here for  stabilizing  coumtry  fund  prices  through  such
mechanisms  as share  repurchases,  new issues,  etc.
The current  level  of country  funds  constitutes  only  a small
fraction  of the total  external  sources  of capital for developing
economies, but  this  is no basis to render them economically
insignificant.  Despite  their small size, country funds can have
enormous impact on the efficiency  of pricing local securities,
which are otherwise  restricted  for foreign  holdings,  and enhance
capital  mobilization  by  firms  in  the  local  markets. Achieving  such
efficiency gains with limited size can address the prevailing
concerns  of emerging  countries  regarding  foreign  control  of local
capital  and the destabilizing  effect  of "hot  money"  from  abroad.
3.  Fund  Premium  or Discount  and a Case for Initial  Discount
subsidization
The country  fund  may sell  at a zero  premium  relative  to its
net  asset  value  even  if  it  originates  from  an  emerging  economy  that
bans or restricts foreign holding of the underlying  securities
directly  through  the  local  markets.  One  such  case  discussed  in  this
paper  is  when  the  country  fund  is  a  perfect  substitute  for  the
component  assets traded in the local (emerging)  markets and is
completely  accessed  by investors  from  both  markets,  for  the  prices
of component  assets  in the local  markets  are bid up to the same
36level  as the country  fund  prices  by the cross-border  arbitrage  of
investors  from emerging  markets.  However,  a positive  or negative
(discount)  premium associated  with incomplete  risk-sharing  may
arise  from  limited access  (access effect) and/or  imperfect
substitution  (substitution  effect).  For instance,  the effect  of
excess volatility of  the  country fund  (negative substitution
effect) may more than offset the positive price effect of the
country fund being accessed  more widely in a global market, and
hence  delivering  discount  on the fund.  By the same token, the
time  variation  of fund  discounts/premia  (see  figure  3) may be due
to time variation in factors affecting  access  and substitution
effects.  For instance,  the factors  affecting  excess  volatility
(e.g.,  investor  sentiment,  noise  trading)  might  change  over  time,
affecting  the substitution  effect.
There  is a policy  issue  when  new issues  of country  funds  are
expected  to trade  at a discount. It  would  become  unprofitable  for
underwriters  to issue  the  funds  through  public  offerings,  since  the
initial investors  would stand to lose relative to waiting and
buying  when the funds  are seasoned. When efficiency  gains  exist
from  the  issuance  of  the funds,  even  when  they  trade  at a  discount,
the issue arises as to whether some institutions,  particularly
domestic public authorities  or development  agencies, take the
initial  loss  so as to promote  the fund  into  existence.
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39Table  X
Alternative  Market  structures
Model  Access by  Degree of  Pricing  Capital  Premium
local  Substitution  Efficiency  Mobiliz-  (+) or
Investors to  of CF for  ation  Discount
Core  local assets  (-)
Model I  Restricted  Ferfect  0  0/+  +
Model II  Unrestricted  Perfect  +  +  none
Model III  Unrestricted  Imperfect  +  +*/
40APPENDIX I
PORTFOLIO EQUILIBRIUM
While  our motivation  is country  fund  pricing  in the
international  context,  the derivation  of the portfolio
equilibrium  is a straightforward  application  of the Mauer-Senbet
(1992)  framework  for the  pricing  of initial  public  issues  in the
domestic  market.  The  MS approach  itself  is a variation  of
earlier  frameworks  by Errunza  and Senbet  (1981),  EL (1985),  and
Merton (1987). Although  all of these  models  possess  similar
structure,  they are set apart  by their  respective  motivations  and
the implications  that  are drawn  for  the particular  economic
phenomena  under  study.  The implications  regarding  country  funds
are  studied  for  alternative  variations  of market  structures  in
the text of the paper.
The investor's  choice  problem  is to maximize  his Von
Neumann-Morgenstern  utility,  U'(  ),  of current  and expected
future  consumption  by picking  fractional  holdings  in the core
market  assets (aci),  in the restricted  assets  from  emerging
markets (ap),  in the aggregate  restricted  market  assets (e*,),  and
riskless  borrowing  or lending  in the amount  Bi  at one-plus  the
riskless  rate of interest,  R.$ If the investor  lacks  access  to
the restricted securities, ap'  =  ati  =  0.  We shall explicitly
include  investor  access  restrictions  at the demand  aggregation
8The  risk-free  asset  is  assumed  internal  with  zero  net  supply.
41stage. 9 In a mean-variance  world,  the investor  faces  the
following  objective  function.
Maximize  U'(CO,  ?  2,  aa(C,))  (Al)
°:I,  atIl  w, B1
subject  to
Co'=  Wo  =  rB  +  occ+  +  F  +F VW  +  W  )(V,  ]  (A2)
*  a,VI(Two  +  Yw)n  (A3  )
)=  (gi)  22(YC)  +  (a)  2  (g2  (YC)  a2  (yF)1
4  (ai)2  [g2(4YC)  +  2(YW)  +  2a.aJCOV(YC,YF)
+  2c4&COV(Yc,  Yc)  + 2ac4aCOV(Yp,  Y4)  (A4)
where
W%'  - the initial  wealth  of investor  i,
C 0'  =  the current  consumption  of investor  i,
C1 =  the  expected  future  consumption  of  investor  i,
a2(Cli)  =  the  variance  of  future  consumption.
Vc  =  the current  value  of all securities  in the core  market
9Like  Mauer and Senbet,  we do not distinguish  between  those
investors  with access  and  those  without  access  to emerging  market
securities  when  deriving  first-order  necessary  conditions. Access
restrictions  are taken into account in the demand aggregation
process.  This differs,  for example, from  Merton (1987)  wherein
Lagrange  multipliers  are utilized  to measure  the shadow  price of
imperfect  accessibility.
42VF =VFC  +  VP  =  the current  value  of assets  in the emerging
market;  decomposable  into  the core  market  spanned
component, VFC, and the unspanned value, VI;
V=  Vwc + Vww  =  the current  value  of restricted  assets  in
the aggregate  of the rest of emerging  markets;
decomposable  into  spanned,  Vwc,  and unspanned,  V,W,
components.
The constraints  in (A2)  - (A4)  can be substituted  into (Al),
yielding  the unconstrained  objective  function  to be maximized
with respect  to the decision  variables. The resulting  first-
order  conditions  are:
au.  _  .'  +  0=  (A5)
aB  +
+c4PCOV(YC,YPC  +c4C¶OV(YC,4,)]  =0O,  (A6)
-U UO  (-VF)  +  lYF+  2U  [ao2  (YP)
a4l
+ acCOV(Yc'  YFY) + a!COV(Y,YW,)J  =  0,  (A7)
aU  =  Uo'  (-V,)  +  1'.  +  2UC[a2(YW)
+ CSCCOV(YC,Y,,') + C4COV(Y,,YW)]  =  O,  (A7)
43where
U'-I  C  ?O  > 0;  =  au  > O;  <jO  =  ___  <
1  8~~~~aQ2  (C  I)
The foregoing  inequalities  follow  the standard  conditions  of
non-satiation  and risk  aversion.
We now explicitly  recognize  emerging  market  accessibility
restrictions  to derive  asset  demands. Let M and H denote  the
number  of investors  with exclusive  access  to the emerging  market
and the rest of the aggregate  emerging  markets,  respectively.
The two sets of investors,  N and  H, are disjoint. The remaining
L investors  are completely  excluded  from  the primary  markets,  and
invest  only in the core  market  securities. We obtain  the
following  implicit  asset  demand  functions  by rearranging  the
first  order  conditions:
risk-free  asset;
U.'I''  =  R  i=l,...,L+M+H
core  market  asset;
COV(Y,acYc  + acY4  + awYec)  = 0  itYc  - RVc]  i=1,...  ,L+M+H,  (A9)
restricted  emergina  market  asset;
COV(Yp,  aFYp  + aUYc)  = 01 [YP  - RVp]  i=1,  ..  (AIO)
44the aggregate of the rest of emerging markets;
COV(Y.,c4WY,  + aCY:)  = ej1Yw  - RVW]  i=l,...,H,  (All)
where
0v  - Uli/(2U 1) = the marginal rate of substitution between
expected future consumption and volatility  (risk), or the inverse
of the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion coefficient.
Note that  (A9) - (All) explicitly recognize that emerging
market investors can access the core market and only their own
securities markets.  As a consequence, in (AlO) aw =  0 for
i=l,...M, and in (All) a,'  =  0 for i=l,...H.
In equilibrium, universal aggregate demand for all assets
must equal universal aggregate supply.  Consider first the demand
for core market assets.  Equation (A9), which is the demand
function for the core market asset, must hold for all L+M+H
investors.  Hence, summing (A9) over all investors yields:
L+M+H  L+M+H
E  COV(Y,  acYc  +  FYF  + a4Y,,)  =  [Yc  - RVc]  e  01.
11  .1  -2.
Market Clearing conditions require that
45L+M+H  X  H





CoV(YC,  Yc + YP  +YW  =  [C  - RVC 0.  (A12)
Or equivalently, upon rearrangement
V'  = R-1TFc - e-1COV(Yc,YAC)],  (A13)
where
YA  =  YC +  ( YC  + YWC)*  (A14)
Equation  (Al3) is the certainty equivalent valuation of Yc,
where, YAC is the aggregate of the core market cash flow and
spannable emerging market cash flow components, and OX  is the
aggregate "price" of risk.
46Similarly,  aggregation  of the  demand  function  (A10)  and
market  clearing  conditions,  along  with the factor  structure  for
cash  flows  in (1)  - (5)  in the text,  delivers  the valuation  for





U.S. Tax Treatment of the Investment Entity (Fund)
The fund may be able to obtain preferred tax treatment relative
to other corporate forms 10 by qualifying as a Regulated
Investment Company  (RIC).  To qualify the following three
conditions must be met:
1)  Derive 90% of gross income from investment activities;
2)  Derive less than 30% of gross income from short term
investments of less than three months;
3)  Meet certain diversification criteria.
Foreign Tax Credit:  The fund can file an election with the IRS
to pass-through to the fund's shareholders the amount of foreign
taxes paid by the fund if more than 50% of the funds total assets
are foreign.  Subject to certain technicalities  (see below) the
foreign taxes paid can be used by shareholders as a credit or
deduction of foreign taxes.
U.S. Tax Rates:
1)  Income Tax and all Distributions: 0%
This is provided that the fund distributes at least 90% of net
investment income  (dividends and distributions received less
'OSince  no corporate  income tax is paid  on distributions to
shareholders.
48operating  expenses)  and 90% of its  net short-term  capital  gains
(excess  of net short-term  capital  gains  over long-term  capital
losses,  if any).  If these  requirements  are not met, a non-
deductible  excise  tax of 4% is incurred.
2)  Undistributed  Net Long-term  Capital  Gains:  34%
Net long-term  capital  gains  are net long-term  capital  gains less
net short-term  capital  losses. If these  are distributed,  no tax
is paid.  If undistributed,  a tax  rate of 34% is imposed.
3)  Carrybacks  and Carryovers:
No carrybacks  are permitted  for  an RIC but capital  losses  can be
carried  over for  8 years.
U.S. Tax Treatment of Individual Investors
This is just  an outline  of tax treatment  of U.S.  residents  or
citizens. Note also  that foreigners  with trade/business
connections  are  treated  as residents  for  tax purposes.
1)  Distributions  of Net Investment  Income  and  Net Short-term
Capital  Gains  are taxed  at ordinary  tax rates.
2)  Distributions  of Net Long-term  Gains  are  taxed  at ordinary
tax rates.  This includes  a return  of capital.
3)  Undistributed  Net Long-term  Gains:  These  are included  in a
shareholder's  income  as long-term  capital  gains,  and the tax
paid by the company (34%)  is credited  to the shareholders
U.S. income  tax payable. Therefore,  the effect  seems  to
49have no effect on individual taxes paid.  The tax basisB 1 of
the shareholder's shares in the fund is increased by the net
amount which is 66% of the undistributed capital gain.
4)  Foreign Tax Credit:  The fund needs to qualify every year12
to pass through foreign taxes to its shareholders.
Foreign income is composed of distributions from foreign
entities.  Foreign capital gains and foreign exchange gains or
losses are par' of U.S. operations.
U.S. indJiiduals typically receive credit for foreign taxes
paid.  Hence, the objective is to treat shareholders of the fund
the same as individuals who receive foreign income.
Shareholders have two options; a) to deduct their share of
foreign income taxes paid by the fund, or b) use them as a tax
credit, but not a mixture.  Deductions are available only to
those shareholders who itemize deductions and have to exceed 2%
of the individual's adjusted gross income.  Deductions reduce the
taxable income, and hence do not provide a one-for-one saving,
unlike credit.  On the other hand, the foreign tax credit cannot
be used to diminish the tax liability from U.S. sources.
"This  is the value  of the investment that  the IRS uses to
calculate the capital gain when the shares are sold.
2Trhe  requirements are that the fund distributes  90% of its
income and that 50% of its assets are foreign.
50FIGURE  1
LAUNCHING  OF  COUNTRY  FUNDS
New  Offeings  in  US  -2Fii  of  US$
25*0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I  -8183  4  5  g  8  Q  J.  -.
10  0
l*
l18  49  6978  9.0o
Emerft  Mufti-Country~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tigure  z




10|  Price  Index
160 
ao  140 co  /
~130 
-
120-  1 AJ
110  1  NAV  Index
100  ,E  r
D1  9
90  M.  ,  ,  . il
Dec  8>3  Dec  89  Dec  90  *Dec  9Figure  3
US-TRADED  COUNTRY  FUNDS









Dec 88  Dec 89:  Dec 90  Dec 91TABLE 2
COUNTRV FUNDS:  COMPARATIVE  VOLATILITIES  (K) FUNDS SORTED BY DESCENDING  RAT;O  (l)/(2) PERIODs SINCE FUND  INCEPT10IN  UNTIL 06/28/91
OD$  FUND 
StO DEVI&TtON  STD DEVIATION  sro  DEVIATION  RATIO  RATIO  RATIO
PRICE RETURNS  "AV RETURNS  lIKT  RETURNS (1)  (2)  (3)  (0)1(2)  (1)J(3)  (2)/(3)
1  SINGAPORE FUND  0.0459642  0.0106574  0.039639  4.31477  1.16009  0.26886
2  FI1ST PHtLIPPINE FUND  0.0608341  0.0149597  0.066033  4.06654  0.02127  0.22655
3  MEXICO EQUITY/INCOME FUND  0.0470027  0.0140794  0.039463  3.38101  1.20626  0.35678
4  JAKARTA GRIOW7  FUtD  0.0622949  0.0185163  0.035196  3.36433  1.63094  0.48477
5  FRANCE GROWJlH  FUND  0.0847729  0.0216454  0.030433  2.99245  2.12835  0.71124
G  POIITUGAI.  FUND  0.0590491  0.0220324  0.029354  2.60905  2.01162  0.77102
1  SPAIN FUIID 
0.0738364  0.0286053  0.027813  2.57401  2.65472  1.03136
a  ItIDONESIA  FUND  0.0628551  0.0248707  0.040010  2.52727  1.57098  0.62161
9  UAlAYSIA  FUNO 
0.0791B97  0.0321039  0.038496  2.46605  2.05659  0.63396
10  CHILE  FUII 
0.0638540  0.0272545  0.034339  2.34288  1.85953  0.79370
11  ITALY FU1D 
0.0610389  0.0280369  0.034380  2.17709  1.77613  0.81583
12  EMERGING MEXICO  FUND  0.0548820  0.0267346  0.030923  2.05284  1.77480  0.86456
13  KOREA FUJID 
0.0615942  0.0301269  0.031360  2.04436  1.96409  0.96074
14  NEW GERdAIIY  FUIID  0.0621019  0.0300592  0.036176  2.01242  1.71668  0.65303
15  AUSTRIA  FU1N) 
0.0881553  0.0455913  0.056396  1.93360  1.56316  0.80842
16  EMERGENG GERMANY FUND  0.0595368  0.0312380  0.036536.  ).90591  1.62952  0.05498
17  IRISH INVESTMENT FUND  0.0448474  0.0238172  0.029734  1.88298  1.50827  0.80100
la  SWISS HELVETIA FUI1D  0.0442271  0.0240356  O.D26437  1.84007  1.67290  0.90915
t9  JAPAII  OTC EQUITY  FUND  0.0798027  0.0434208  0.046979  1.83973  1.70037  0.92425
20  UNITED  KINGDOM FUNO  0.0491958  0.0268796  0.029079  1.83023  1.69177  0.92435
21  GERNANY FUND 
0.0692195  0.0380740  0.030568  1.81803  2.26441  1.24553
22  FUTURE GERM1ANY  FUNID  0.0578084  0.0324509  0.036171  1.78141  1.59021  0.B9716
23  FIRST AUSTRALIA FUND  0.0537279  0.0313747  0.024834  1.7124B  2.16352  1.26340
2-t  GROWTH FUND OF SPAItI  0.0407491  0.0273317  0.035770  1.71043  1.30693  0.76409
25  THAI FUND 
0.0073030  0.0417360  0.040891  1.61251  1.43530  0.89010
26  INDIA GRIWlH FUND  0.0511082  0.0321037  0.035560  1.59197  1.43722  0.90279
27  TthAl  CAPITAL FUND  0.0708192  0.0450264  0.073010  1.57287  0.96999  0.61670
28  TAIWA1I  FUND 
0.0964076  0.0633112  0.075332  1.52276  1.27978  0.84043
29  nOC TAIWAN fUND  0.0720099  0.0525405  0.084309  1.37035  0.85412  0.62329
30  MEXICO FUNO 
0.0728115  0.0558739  0-.064383  1.30314  1.13091  0.86703
31  TURKiSIf  FUND 
0.0721610  0.073144t  0.093552  0.98658  0.77135  0.781U5
32  BRAZIL FUND 
0.0741052  0.0824737  0.111304  0.99853  0.66579  0.74098Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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